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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE USE OF TVO-WAY
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO TAKE
TESTIMONY OF CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX
CRIMIES
INTRODUCTION
There are approximately 200,000 incidents of child sexual abuse in the
United States each year.1 In 1982, there were 4000 reported cases of
1. R. Geiser, Hidden Victims: The Sexual Abuse of Children 6 (1979); Rogers,
Child Sexual Abuse and the Courts: Preliminary Findings, in Social Work and Child
Sexual Abuse 145, 145 (J. Conte & D. Shore eds. 1982). The definition of child sexual
abuse has been problematic for many psychologists and social workers. See L Geiser,
supra, at 7-8; Conte, Sexual Abuse Of Children: Enduring Issues for Social Work, in
Social Work and Child Sexual Abuse 1, 2-6 (J. Conte & D. Shore eds. 1982). Most state
criminal statutes, however, specifically define sexual offenses between adults and children
and classify them as felonies. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-66 (1982); Alaska Stat. § 11.41.434
(1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1404 (Supp. 1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1808 (1977);
Cal. Penal Code § 2660) (West Supp. 1985); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405 (1978 & Supp.
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-71 (1983); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 762 (1979); D.C. Code
Ann. §§ 22-2801, -3501 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05 (West 1976); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 16-6-4 (1984); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-736 (1976); Idaho Code § 18-1506(1) (Supp.
1984); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 12-14(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-42-4-3 (Bums Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 709.3 (West 1979); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3503 (Supp. 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.110 (1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:81.2
(West Supp. 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 252 (1983); Md. Ann. Code art. 27,
§ 463 (1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22A (West 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 750.520b (West Supp. 1984-1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.342 (West Supp. 1984);
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-95, -101 (Supp. 1984); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.100 (1979); Mont.
Code Ann. § 45-5-502 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01 (Supp. 1984); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 200.366(2)(c) (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:2 (Supp. 1983); NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:14-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11.A(1) (1984); N.Y. Penal
Law § 130.65(3) (McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1983);
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02 (Page Supp.
1983); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1123 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.425
(1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3122 (Purdon 1983); RI. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 to -
8.4 (Supp. 1984); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 22-22-7 (Supp. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-605 (1982); Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1983); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1984); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.3 (Michie 1982); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 9A.44.070-.100 (Supp. 1985); W. Va. Code §§ 61-8B-3, -5, -7, -9 (1984); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v), -
304 (Michie 1983).
In addition, sexual exploitation of children for the purposes of producing visual depic-
tions is a federal offense. See Act of Feb. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7,
amended by Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 3, 98 Stat. 204 (current
version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1984)). Section 2251(a) states:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any mi-
nor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (c), if such person
knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such visual depiction has actu-
ally been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
Id. Subsection (b) makes parents who knowingly allow a child to participate in such a
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
child molestation in New York State alone.2 Moreover, experts agree
that incidents of child molestation are grossly underreported.3 Despite
production also subject to the sanctions in subsection (c). See id. (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2251(b) (West 1984)). Violators may be fined up to $100,000 or imprisoned
up to ten years, or both. Id. (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(c) (West 1984)).
Recidivists and organizational violaters may receive even higher penalties. Id. "Sexually
explicit conduct" is defined as "actual or simulated-
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic; [sic] abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person."
Act of Feb. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 8, redesignated by Child Protec-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 5(b), 98 Stat. 205, amended by Child Protection
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 205 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2255(2) (West 1984)).
Thus, sexual abuse of children may be considered to fall into three basic categories:
sexual contact between adults and children, sexual exploitation of children and exhibi-
tionism. See Conte, supra, at 2.
2. K. Mayer, Child Sexual Abuse and New York Law 9 (1984) (unpublished manu-
script) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). In 1980, the following number of
children were treated at the Sexual Assault Center at Seattle's Harborview Hospital:
0-4 years old-127
5-8 years old-172
9-12 years old-155
13-16 years old-275
Comment, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual
Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 387, 387 n.1 (1984) (citing Sexual
Assault Center, Harborview Hospital, Seattle, Wash., Client Characteristics 5 (1980))
[hereinafter cited as Confronting Child Victims].
3. F. Rush, The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children 4 (1980) (quoting one
expert who estimates that 50-80% of child molestation cases are not reported and an-
other who states that child sexual abuse is greatly underreported); see R. Geiser, supra
note 1, at 9-10 (author estimates that there are two or three unreported cases for every
reported one); Berliner, Counseling and Follow-Up Interaction for the Sexually Abused
Child, in Management of the Physically and Emotionally Abused 281, 282 (C. Warner &
G. Braen eds. 1982) (author believes that reported cases of child sexual abuse are only a
fraction of actual incidents); De Francis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Com-
mitted by Adults, Fed. Probation, Sept. 1971, at 15, 17 (same); Sgroi, Sexual Molestation
of Children: The Last Frontier in Child Abuse, in The Sexual Victimology of Youth 25,
27 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (same); Summit & Kryso, SexualAbuse of Children: A Clinical
Spectrum, 48 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 237, 238 (1978) (authors cite a survey that found
that only six percent of child sexual abuse cases were reported).
Many factors contribute to this reporting problem. First, very young children do not
understand that they have been sexually abused. Prager, "Sexual Psychopathy" and
Child Molesters. The Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv. L. 49, 62 n.56 (1982). Second, infants
cannot communicate the fact that they have been sexually molested. Id. Third, children
are afraid that adults may not believe them. See M. Fortune, Sexual Violence: The Un-
mentionable Sin 168-69 (1983); Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Wit-
nesses, in The Sexual Victimology of Youth 246, 251 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). Finally,
children fear that the molester may carry out the threats he made to them to ensure
nondisclosure. Berliner, supra, at 282.
One author believes that many adults cannot conceive of such a heinous crime and,
that they therefore ignore the problem. See M. Fortune, supra, at 164. She cites Freud as
a prime example. Id. Freud, during a lecture, stated that "almost all my women patients
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the increasing number of assaults,4 it remains very difficult to prosecute
these cases.5 One reason is that parents are reluctant to put their chil-
dren through the further trauma of litigation.6 Another is that reliable,
competent testimony of the child victims is difficult to obtain.7 A large
told me that they had been seduced by their father. I was driven to recognize in the end
that these reports were untrue and so came to understand that the hysterical symptoms
are derived from phantasies and not from real occurrences." S. Freud, The Complete
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 584 (1964).
4. See Stevens & Berliner, supra note 3, at 246 (there has been a steady increase in
the number of child sexual abuse victims referred to the Sexual Assault Center since
1973); cf. J. Kroth, Child Sexual Abuse 3-4 (1979) (suggests that what we are experienc-
ing is an increase in reported cases of child sexual abuse due either to increased occur-
rences or to society's heightened awareness or openness).
5. See Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63
Geo. L.J. 257, 258 (1974) (because of evidentiary problems, few child abuse cases are
prosecuted) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Problems]; Confronting Child Victims, supra
note 2, at 387 (difficulty in obtaining convictions results from testimony poorly given or
not given at all because children are considered to be incompetent witnesses); K. Mayer,
supra note 2, at 1, 9 (inability to prosecute many child sexual abuse cases in New York
was caused by § 130.16 of the New York Penal Law, which required the child's testi-
mony to be corroborated by independent evidence).
6. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17
New Eng. L. Rev. 643, 651 (1982); see also J. Kroth, supra note 4, at 26 (parents fear the
litigation process). This fear is not unfounded. See B. Karpman, The Sexual Offender
and His Offenses 70 (1954) (recounting the events and details of the crime may be as
damaging to the child victim of a sex offense as the crime itself); J. Kroth, supra note 4, at
26 (initial interview may be traumatic); National Legal Resource Center for Child Advo-
cacy and Protection, Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommendations for Improving Legal Interven-
tion in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases 12 (1982) (testifying is traumatic for child
victims); J. Palmer, The Psychological Assessment of Children 522-23 (1983) (testifying
in open court may impede sexual development of a child molestation victim); Chaneles,
Child Victims of Sexual Offenses, Fed. Probation, June 1967, at 52, 54 (udicial proceed-
ings "may be as damaging to the child victim as the initial sex crime"); De Francis, supra
note 3, at 16 (describing the various emotional traumas to which a child may be subjected
during investigative and court proceedings); Haas, The Use of Videotape in Child Abuse
Cases, 8 Nova L.J. 373, 373 (1984) (reiterating the event risks further trauma to the child
victim of sexual abuse); Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in
the Criminal Justice System, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 977, 983-86, 1015 (1969) (child victims of
sex crimes may be traumatized by the legal proceedings); Parker, supra, at 644-53 (same);
Rogers, supra note 1, at 145-46 (subsequent judicial process may result in "secondary
victimization"); Schultz, The Victim and the Justice System-An Introduction, in The
Sexual Victimology of Youth 171, 171 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (reiterating the details of the
sex crime assumed to cause psychic trauma for the child victim); Stevens & Berliner,
supra note 3, at 248 (the legal proceedings may be more damaging than the crime itselk).
But see Rogers, supra note 1, at 146-47 (participation in the judicial process may not be as
damaging as some think).
Parents who object during the trial to the further victimization of their child by the
judicial process will find it difficult to rescind a complaint against the defendant. Libai,
supra, at 978. The state considers its interest in prosecution to be greater than the par-
ents' interest in avoiding further trauma to the child. Id. This policy may be an addi-
tional deterrent to parents' bringing complaints of child sexual abuse.
7. See Meyers, Little Witnesses, Student Law., Sept. 1982, at 14, 16 (there is a danger
that a child will combine fact and imagination when relating an event); Stafford, The
Child as a Witness, 37 Wash. L. Rev. 303, 309 (1962) (same); Evidentiary Problems, supra
note 5, at 259-60 & n.16 (children's testimony is susceptible to influence by parents and
alleged abuser). But see Goleman, Studies of Children as Witnesses Find Surprising Accu-
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portion of the potential trauma stems from the child victim's fear of be-
ing in the same room with the alleged molester.' Although this fear can
be avoided by allowing the child to testify in the absence of the accused, 9
the criminal defendant has a right under the sixth amendment to con-
racy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1984, at Cl, C4 (recent psychological studies have found that
children's memories are as reliable as adults').
A child's competency to testify is not determined by his or her age. Wheeler v. United
States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895); United States v. Schoefield, 465 F.2d 560, 561-62 (D.C.
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972); Doran v. United States, 205 F.2d
717, 718-19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Beausoliel v. United States, 107
F.2d 292, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (quoting Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25
(1895)); McCormick on Evidence § 62, at 156 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as McCormick on Evidence]; Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 Law & Hum.
Behav. 73, 73 (1981); see United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir.) (child's age
was not a factor in the court's determination of competency), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846
(1976); United States v. Hardin, 443 F.2d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same); Pocatello v.
United States, 394 F.2d 115, 117 n.4 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). Instead, it is determined by
the "capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between
truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former." Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524.
This rule is still good law. See United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050, 1054 (10th
Cir. 1973); Schoefield, 465 F.2d at 562; Pocatello, 394 F.2d at 117 n.4.
The determination of competency is made by the trial judge and is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524-25; Hardin, 443 F.2d at 737;
Beausoliel, 107 F.2d at 293. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb trial courts' compe-
tency decisions unless clearly erroneous. The rationale is that these decisions are based
on factors at trial which cannot be transcribed into the record. Hardin, 443 F.2d at 737.
A judge is better able to weigh such factors as attitude, demeanor, intelligence and capac-
ity for moral responsibility. Doran, 205 F.2d at 718-19.
"The ultimate test of competence of a young child is whether he has the requisite
intelligence and mental capacity to understand, recall and narrate his impressions of an
occurrence." Schoefield, 465 F.2d at 562; see also Perez, 526 F.2d at 865 (court using the
Schoefield test found that the child witnesses understood the questions and answered
intelligently); McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 62, at 156 (stating that the traditional
test is one of requisite intelligence and the child's acknowledgment of his or her duty to
be truthful).
Wigmore disagrees. He suggests that it is unnecessary to declare children competent
before they testify. The child's testimony should be considered as is every other witness'
testimony. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 509, at 719-20 (3. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
Three states-Minnesota, Missouri and Utah- have followed Wigmore's suggestion, but
only for child victims of molestation. Utah's law states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, a child victim
of sexual abuse, under the age of ten, shall be considered a competent witness
and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial pro-
ceeding. The trier of fact shall be permitted to determine the weight and credi-
bility to be given to the testimony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-410 (Supp. 1983). Minnesota's and Missouri's statutes are simi-
lar. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(6) (West Supp. 1984); Mo. Ann. Stat. §491.060(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
The procedure proposed in this Note does not affect the determination of competency.
It provides a method of bringing in competent testimony.
8. Libai, supra note 6, at 984, 1018; Parker, supra note 6, at 652-53; cf. L. Holm-
strom & A. Burgess, The Victim of Rape 226 (1978) ("Some victims reacted visibly to
seeing the defendant. One became visibly nervous as the defendant, his family, and
friends came in and sat down behind her in the courtroom.").
9. Libai, supra note 6, at 1016-18.
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front his accuser.1" This constitutional right, while important, is not
absolute.'1
Courts have attempted in various ways to balance the defendant's right
of confrontation and the state's interest in prosecuting child molestation
cases. 2 Both interests are not always equally protected. In a recent Cal-
ifornia case," for example, the prosecution proposed the use of two-way
closed circuit television to take the testimony of child victims of sex
crimes.' 4 The court, however, ruled that this procedure could not be
used. 5 Consequently, the children had to testify in the same room as the
accused. The court based its decision on the fact that California had no
statutory provision allowing this procedure. 6 It also suggested that the
procedure might be constitutionally infirm, 7 but declined to rule on this
issue.'8 Thus, the court protected the criminal defendant's right of con-
frontation, yet failed to secure the state's interest.
This Note argues that allowing child victims of sexual abuse to testify
via two-way closed circuit television in a separate room from the defend-
ant is the best way to effectuate the state's interest in prosecuting these
cases without diminishing the defendant's confrontation rights. Part I
discusses the difficulties of obtaining the testimony of victims in child
molestation cases and explores possible alternatives that might ease the
child victims' trauma of testifying. Part II examines the meaning of the
right of confrontation. Part III discusses the constitutional considera-
tions in balancing the defendant's right of confrontation and the state's
interest in prosecuting child molestation cases. It demonstrates that the
use of two-way closed circuit television to take the testimony of child
victims of sex crimes strikes the most acceptable balance. This Note con-
cludes that a victim of child molestation should be allowed to testify in a
10. The sixth amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.. . ..." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
11. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (confrontation right is an extremely
important trial right, but it may have to yield to "competing interests, if 'closely ex-
amined' ") (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (state's interest in protecting a juveniles criminal record does
not outweigh right to confrontation); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)
(right to confrontation is not absolute and may be outweighed by a state interest, but the
state interest must be scrutinized).
12. See, e.g., Parisi v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 211, , 192 Cal. Rptr. 486,
491 (1983) (magistrate allowed eight year old child, too embarrassed to talk, to whisper
her answer to him as to where the defendant had touched her); Herbert v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 664-65, 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 851, 855 (1981) (finding
unconstitutional the trial court's seating of the defendant, who was charged with sexual
offenses against a five year old, so that he and the child victim were not in each other's
view).
13. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
14. See id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
15. See id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
16. See id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
17. See id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
18. See id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
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room separate from the alleged molester via two-way closed circuit tele-
vision if the prosecution shows by a preponderance of evidence that the
victim will suffer additional trauma if forced to testify in the same room
as the defendant.
I. BRINGING CHILD MOLESTATION CASES TO PROSECUTION
In child molestation cases, the key witness is the child.19 Because of
the nature of the crime, there are usually no other witnesses to child
sexual abuse.20 The child is the only one who really knows what hap-
pened,2" yet his or her testimony often is lost. The major reason 22 is that
parents are unwilling to subject their already traumatized child23 to fur-
ther trauma in the courtroom.24 In a typical case, the child victim will be
19. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 15; Schultz, supra note 6, at 177-79.
20. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 15; Schultz, supra note 6, at 177; K. Mayer, supra
note 2, at 4; cf. Bahlmann & Johnson, Trial Issues in Child Abuse, in Child Abuse and
Neglect 223, 225 (1977) (child abuse usually has no witnesses besides family members);
Evidentiary Problems, supra note 5, at 258 (same).
21. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 15; K. Mayer, supra note 2, at 4.
22. Another reason for the unavailability of a child victim's testimony is that the
child may be considered incompetent to testify. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
The procedure proposed in this Note does not affect the competency determination. It
does, however, provide a method for obtaining testimony from child victims who have
been deemed competent.
23. See M. de Young, The Sexual Victimization of Children 46-64, 77-78 (1982) (dis-
cussing the effects of paternal incest on the child victim both during and after the abuse:
isolation in the family, feelings of worthlessness, guilt, "acting out," "sexual acting out,"
psychological disturbance, physical problems, lesbianism, prostitution, thoughts of sui-
cide); id. at 71-73 (stating the effects of maternal incest on sons: withdrawal, sexual
problems); id. at 132-38 (discussing the "rape trauma syndrome" and the "accessory to
sex syndrome" that occur as results of heterosexual pedophilia); id. at 157-60 (some of
the psychological and physical effects of homosexual pedophilia on the victims are depen-
dency, nightmares and headaches); R. Geiser, supra note 1, at 27-29 (discussing the
"time-bomb effect" of child rape); B. Karpman, supra note 6, at 67-70 (citing studies that
have shown that effects on child victims may include sexual delinquency, mental distur-
bance, an extension of the infantile stage or anxiety); J. Palmer, supra note 6, at 522 (child
sexual abuse in itself causes damage to the child); F. Rush, supra note 3, at 6 (child
victims may suffer from rectal fissures, torn anal and vaginal walls, venereal disease, and
may become pregnant or die); id. at 7-10 (the emotional effects on the child victim may
include severe depression or inability to function normally); Berliner, supra note 3, at 283
(child may withdraw or regress as a result of sexual abuse); Berliner & Stevens, Clinical
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse, in Social Work and Child Sexual Abuse, 93, 103-05 (Q.
Conte & D. Shore eds. 1982) (effects of child molestation may include venereal disease,
hysterical seizures, sexual dysfunction, fear, nightmares, regression, withdrawal, prostitu-
tion); Chandler, Knowns and Unknowns in Sexual Abuse of Children, in Social Work and
Child Sexual Abuse, 51, 61-63 (J. Conte & D. Shore eds. 1982) (child molestation can
cause the child to suffer fear, confusion, nightmares, mood swings, withdrawal, depres-
sion, low self-esteem); Conte, supra note 1, at 11-12 (citing studies that show that effects
on child victims of sexual abuse include hysterical seizures, stomach aches, negative dys-
function). But see B. Karpman, supra note 6, at 67-68 (citing one study that found little
harmful effect on victims of child molestation); Conte, supra note 1, at 11 (citing four
studies that did not find detrimental results in child victims of sexual abuse).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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questioned by the police,' will testify at the preliminary hearing26 and, if
the crime is a felony, will testify at the grand jury hearing." All this
precedes the child's testimony at trial. Even when the defense counsel is
gentle in cross-examination,28 these experiences can be harrowing for the
child.29 In addition, the child victim is afraid to be in the same room
with the defendant30 and is intimidated by an open court with a jury and
spectators.31
As a result of this loss of the key witness' testimony, the prosecution in
a child molestation case must generally rely on expert testimony of physi-
cians,32 demonstrative evidence-for example, x-rays and photo-
25. Chaneles, supra note 6, at 54; De Francis, supra note 3, at 16; Libai, supra note 6,
at 986.
26. De Francis, supra note 3, at 16; Libai, supra note 6, at 1005; Parker, supra note 6,
at 651.
27. De Francis, supra note 3, at 16; Libai, supra note 6, at 1005-06.
28. De Francis, supra note 3, at 16. A defense counsel might fare better if he or she
does not appear to be badgering the child witness. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 51.
29. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
30. See L. Holmstrom & A. Burgess, supra note 8, at 226; Libai, supra note 6, at 984,
1018; Parker, supra note 6, at 651.
31. See Libai, supra note 6, at 1014; Parker, supra note 6, at 651-53; Confronting
Child Victims, supra note 2, at 387.
32. BahImann & Johnson, supra note 20, at 225; cf. Evidentiary Problems, supra note
5, at 260-62 (discussing the importance of medical testimony in child abuse cases). Medi-
cal evidence can take various forms. A physician may testify that in his opinion a partic-
ular injury occurred in a certain way. See Bahlmann & Johnson, supra note 20, at 226.
An examining physician may testify as to statements made by the patient for purposes of
medical diagnosis and treatment. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). "Statements made for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or exter-
nal source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are admissi-
ble as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id These may include statements of a then existing
physical state or statements of medical history or of causation if "reasonably pertinent"
to treatment or diagnosis, but would not include statements as to fault. Fed. R. Evid.
803(4) advisory committee note; McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 292, at 839-40,
see United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-85 (8th Cir. 1980) (child victim's descrip-
tion of sexual abuse to doctor admissible because cause of injury was reasonably pertinent
to treatment), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (physician allowed to testify as to child victim's
statements of causation but not as to statements concerning identity of the molester).
This evidence can also be admitted in most state courts because more than half of the
states have adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See McCor-
mick on Evidence, supra note 7, at xv.
The statement need not be made to a medical doctor. Statements to hospital personnel,
family members or ambulance drivers may be included under this exception. Fed. R.
Evid. 803(4) advisory committee note, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 292, at
840. Statements made to a physician who has been engaged for litigation are also admis-
sible if made for diagnosis or treatment purposes. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory commit-
tee note. Moreover, the defendant may not use the physician-patient privilege as a bar to
the physician's testimony because the patient holds the privilege and therefore may waive
it. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 102, at 252-53; see 8 J. Wigmore, supra note
7, § 2386, at 851 (rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1983); see, eg., State v. Fackrell, 44 Wash. 2d
874, 878, 271 P.2d 679, 681 (1954); State v. Thomas, I Wash. 2d 298, 304-05, 95 P.2d
1036, 1039 (1939); Bahlmann & Johnson, supra note 20, at 232. Medical evidence may
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graphs 33-and testimony based on hearsay exceptions.34 The medical
testimony and demonstrative evidence may prove that the child was mo-
lested 35 but cannot, in most instances, specifically link the crime to the
accused.36 If the court finds the child incompetent or unwilling to testify,
it may still admit the child's prior statements as present sense impres-
sions or excited utterances. These statements must have been made to a
competent witness and must meet all the requirements for Federal Rules
of Evidence 803(1) and 803(2) respectively.37 Courts could also expand
the res gestae rule to allow the testimony of a person with whom a child
under ten discussed the event.38 It should be noted, however, that both
also be admitted as hospital records under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Bahlmann & Johnson,
supra note 20, at 235-40; see Evidentiary Problems, supra note 5, at 270.
33. Bahlmann & Johnson, supra note 20, at 240-42; Evidentiary Problems, supra note
5, at 273.
34. Bahlmann & Johnson, supra note 20, at 242-48. The hearsay exception most ap-
plicable to the admission of a child's statement is Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (excited utterance)
which states that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition" is admissi-
ble.
There is a trend toward allowing more time to elapse between the event and the state-
ment made in child sexual abuse cases. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 297, at
859 n.49; see Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 560, 338 A.2d 344, 346 (1975) (testimony
of emergency room doctor as to statement made by three year old victim of child abuse
within hours of receiving the injury admissible as an excited utterance); State v. Duncan,
53 Ohio St. 2d 215, 217-18, 222, 373 N.E.2d 1234, 1235-36, 1238 (1978) (testimony of
mother as to statement made by a six year old victim of sexual abuse within hours of the
incident allowed as part of the res gestae); State v. Bouchard, 31 Wash. App. 381, 383-84,
639 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1982) (testimony of mother as to statement made by a three year
old victim of sexual abuse within hours of the incident admissible as an excited utterance
hearsay exception); State ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, 69 Wis. 2d 668, 683-84, 230 N.W.2d
890, 898-99 (1975) (statements by five year old sexual abuse victim made within a day of
the incident to his mother admissible under excited utterance hearsay exception); Love v.
State, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 219 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1974) (testimony of mother of a three
year old victim of sexual abuse as to statements the child made to her the morning after
the incident admitted as part of the res gestae or as an excited utterance). There are,
however, limits on this expansion. See State v. Lovely, 110 Ariz. 219, 220, 517 P.2d 81,
82 (1973) (en banc) (statement made to an officer by a seven year old victim of sexual
abuse not admissible as part of the res gestae because it was not made until two weeks
after the crime took place).
35. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, §292, at 839-40; Evidentiary Problems,
supra note 5, at 272-73.
36. See United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(admitting physician's testimony as to the child victim's statements of causation but not
those relating to the identity of the molester); see also Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory
committee note (statements of fault not admissible); McCormick on Evidence, supra note
7, § 292, at 841 (same).
37. The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule states that "[a] state-
ment describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was per-
ceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter" is admissible. Fed. R. Evid.
803(1). See supra note 34 for the definition of the the excited utterance exception, Fed. R.
Evid. 803(2). As stated above, these exceptions are also applicable in most state courts
because more than half of the states have adopted evidence codes based on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, at xv.
38. One commentator has suggested that the res gestae exception be expanded. See
Parker, supra note 6, at 670-71. Res gestae is a somewhat indefinite term but has gener-
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on the federal level and in many states, there is no res gestae exception to
the hearsay rule.39 Although these alternative forms of testimony might
prove helpful to the case,4" the most persuasive testimony-that of the
child victim himself or herself-is absent.4" Any substitute for the
child's direct testimony is unlikely to be as convincing, and thus the pros-
ecution is unlikely to be as successful.
Rather than forego the use of the most crucial testimony in child mo-
lestation cases, courts and commentators have attempted to devise alter-
native methods of taking a child victim's testimony.42 These methods are
ally been used to introduce into evidence any words that accompany a litigated or rele-
vant fact. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 288, at 835-36; see State v. Boodry,
96 Ariz. 259, 263, 394 P.2d 196, 199 (en banc) (five year old victim's spontaneous expres-
sions to the first person she saw after her father raped her held to be part of the res gestae
and therefore admissible), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964).
Courts and commentators have criticized the phrase "res gestae" because of its impre-
cision. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 288, at 836; see, e.g., Wheeler v. United
States, 211 F.2d 19, 23 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); Coryell
v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 534, 538, 4 P.2d 295, 296 (1931) (Houser, J.,
concurring); Williams v. State, 188 So. 2d 320, 323-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd,
198 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1967); Honick v. Walden, 10 Md. App. 714, 717, 272 A.2d 406, 408
(1971); 6 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1767, at 255 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). As one
commentator stated, "[tihe marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute
for reasoning, and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccu-
rate terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the
admissibility of evidence as 'res gestae'." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utter-
ances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.L 229, 229 (1922) (emphasis in original).
Both McCormick and Wigmore believe the phrase "res gestae" should be discarded.
See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 288, at 836; 6 J. Wigmore, supra note 7,
§ 1767, at 255 (. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). The Model Code of Evidence does not
mention the phrase. 6 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1767, at 256 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1976). Others, however, still use the phrase. See State v. Galvan, 297 N.W.2d 344,
347 (Iowa 1980) (court considered admissibility of testimony under the res gestae
exception).
39. See 6 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1767, at 256 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976)
(phrase "res gestae" is not mentioned in Model Code of Evidence). For a discussion of
the relationship between the Model Code of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
see McCormick on Evidence, supra note 7, § 326, at 915-16. The pertinent Federal Rule
of Evidence is Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). As stated above, more than half of the states have
adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See McCormick on
Evidence, supra note 7, at xv.
40. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Parisi v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 211, , 192 Cal. Rptr. 486,
490 (1983) (child victim/witness in sexual abuse case allowed to whisper her response to
the magistrate as to where the defendant had touched her); Herbert v. Superior Court,
117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 664-65, 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 851, 855 (1981) (unsuccessful
attempt to allow child victim of sexual abuse to be seated so that defendant was not
within child's view); Libai, supra note 6, at 1014-32 (Libai proposes a trial in a "child
courtroom" with only the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel and a child examiner pres-
ent. The defendant, jury and spectators could view the trial through a one-way glass.
Alternatively, Libai suggests that the child victim testify only once, in a special hearing
held prior to trial.); Meyers, supra note 7, at 16 (prosecution lawyer may simply stand
between the child and the defendant, thereby blocking their views of each other when the
child victim must testify in the same room as the defendant); Parker, supra note 6, at 669-
70 (defendant should remain out of child victim's sight at trial unless his appearance is
1985] 1003
1004 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
all geared toward alleviating some of the testifying child's trauma. 43 In
addition, some techniques used by the courts for traumatized adult vic-
tims may also be considered for use in child molestation cases. 44 The
major intention behind these suggestions is to limit or obscure the vic-
tim/witness' view of the defendant.45 For example, the testimony of
traumatized victims can be videotaped before trial with the defendant
and the witness kept from each other's view46 or the child testifying in
person can be seated in such a way that he or she cannot see the defend-
required for identification; child's deposition should be videotaped with the defendant,
spectators and other court personnel behind a one-way glass, out of the child witness'
view; recordings of initial interviews with the child victim/witness should be used instead
of live testimony; answers previously recorded can be used instead of live cross-examina-
tion if the defense counsel's questions on cross-examination were previously asked during
the initial interview); Casenote, The Final Resting of the "Tender Years" Exception to the
Hearsay Rule: People v. Kreiner, 1984 Det. C.L. Rev. 117, 132 n.97 (prosecutor may
stand between the child witness and the defendant to block their views of one another)
[hereinafter cited as Tender Years Exception]; Comment, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is It
Constitutional?, 7 J. Juv. L. 31, 37 (1983) (suggests the use of a two-way closed circuit
television that allows the defendant to view the child victim/witness throughout the pro-
ceeding, but the child views the defendant only for a moment at the beginning of the
proceeding and is told that the defendant is watching.) [hereinafter cited as Libai's Child
Courtroom].
Many state legislatures have passed laws that make it easier to prosecute child molest-
ers. See K. Mayer, supra note 2, at 12. These include, inter alia, enactment of harsher
sexual abuse laws and sentences, permission to videotape testimony of the child victim,
and elimination of the competency requirement for witnesses who are victims of child
molestation. Id. At least twelve states have videotaping statutes. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 12-2311 to -2312 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-2035 to -2036 (Supp. 1983); Cal.
Penal Code § 1346 (West Supp. 1985); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-413 (Supp. 1984); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.350 (Supp. 1984); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-401 to -402
(1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-17 (1984); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 23A-12-9 to -10
(Supp. 1984); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 967.04(7) (West 1985). New York admits videotaped testimony of child victims
of sex crimes at a grand jury hearing but not at trial. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 190.30(4) (Consol. 1985).
43. See Parisi v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 211, , 192 Cal. Rptr. 486, 490
(1983); Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 664-65, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 851
(1981); Libai, supra note 6, at 1014; Meyers, supra note 7, at 16; Parker, supra note 6, at
647; Tender Years Exception, supra note 42, at 132 n.97.
44. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (reversing
trial court's decision to allow the testimony of a traumatized adult victim to be video-
taped; victim's psychiatrist testified that a less stressful method of taking the victim's
testimony should be used, so defendant was able to view the proceeding and stop it at any
time to consult with counsel, and victim was unaware that the defendant was watching);
People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 2d 78, 82, 195 P.2d 393, 395 (adult woman allowed to testify
facing jury but with back toward some spectators; defendant held oblique view of her),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948), overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d
209, 232, 302 P.2d 307, 322 (1956), overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal.
2d 631, 648-49, 388 P.2d 33, 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212 (1964).
45. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.350(4) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann.
art. 38.071(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985); see also Libai, supra note 6, at 1028-32; Parker, supra
note 6, at 668-70. One commentator suggests the testimony be videotaped after the trial
begins. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Tvo Legis-
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ant.47 While these suggestions reduce the stress on the child, care must
be taken to avoid eviscerating the criminal defendant's fundamental 48
sixth amendment right of confrontation.
II. THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
Any technique designed to diminish the child victim's additional
trauma in testifying must pass constitutional muster under the confronta-
tion clause of the sixth amendment,49 which provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. . . ."o Because there is no available legisla-
tive history on the confrontation clause,51 one must look to judicial inter-
pretations to understand the meaning and the scope of the sixth
amendment right of confrontation.52
lative Innovations, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 806, 824-25, 826-27 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Sex
Abuse Prosecutions].
47. See People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 2d 78, 82, 195 P.2d 393, 395, cert. denied, 335
U.S. 835 (1948), overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 232, 302
P.2d 307, 322 (1956), overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 648-
49, 388 P.2d 33, 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212 (1964).
48. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
49. See Libai, supra note 6, at 1018; Parker, supra note 6, at 646; Libai's Child Court-
room, supra note 42, at 34.
50. U.S. Coast. amend. VI.
51. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8 (1970). The confrontation clause was
submitted without debate. Id. at 176; see also Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 Geo. L.J. 939, 953 (1968) (stating that "standard
historical literature" is not illuminating in the determination of the meaning of the con-
frontation clause); Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hear-
say Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 742-43 (1965) (same); Note,
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale LJ. 1434, 1436 n. 10 (1966) (stating that the
sole historical insight to the confrontation clause is F. Heller's work, The Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States (1951)). It has been stated that the con-
frontation clause has its roots in the common law right that emerged after the abuse in
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States 104 (1951).
The Supreme Court also stated that the bifurcated rights of confrontation and cross-
examination expressed in the sixth amendment have "ancient roots." Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). These rights were also protected in Rome more than two
thousand years ago. See id. at 496 n.25.
52. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.03, at 353 (C. Sands
rev. 4th ed. 1984) ("Long-continued contemporaneous and practical interpretation of a
statute by the... courts. . . constitutes an invaluable aid in determining the meaning
of [constitutional provisions].").
A preliminary step in the interpretation of a law is to look at the plain meaning of the
words. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); 2A N. Singer, supra,
§ 45.01, at 1. In order to determine how to construe a law, however, the legislative intent
in enacting the law must be considered. 2A N. Singer, supra, § 45.05, at 20-21. A literal
examination of the words in the confrontation clause would result in the conclusion that
only testimony by witnesses physically present in the courtroom is admissible. Griswold,
The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 713 (1971). It is
obvious that the Supreme Court chose to interpret the confrontation clause not by the
plain meaning of its words but rather in conjunction with the law as it existed at the time
of enactment. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Griswold, supra, at
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Early Supreme Court decisions construing the confrontation clause de-
scribe the defendant's right to confront his accuser as twofold. 3 First,
the defendant has a right to a face-to-face meeting with his accuser at
trial.54 This is so that the jury may judge whether the witness is being
truthful by observing the witness' demeanor while testifying in front of
the defendant.55 The purpose of the face-to-face confrontation is to allow
the fact-finder the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness
when making his or her accusation in front of the one person who knows
if he or she is being truthful. 6 Second, the defendant has the right to
cross-examine the witness. 57 The rationale for this right is to test the
truth of the testimony given.5" Although later Supreme Court cases
seem to emphasize that the primary purpose of the confrontation clause
is the right of the defendant to cross-examine 9 and that the right to
714. The law at the time of adoption recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id.; see
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44.
53. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
54. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). The scope of this
right extends to all stages of the trial. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th
Cir. 1979). A deposition is a stage of the trial. Id.; State v. Turner, 345 N.W.2d 552, 559
(Iowa Ct. App. 1983). The scope of the confrontation right does not extend to voir dire
for witness competency determinations. State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 555, 490 P.2d
558, 561 (1971). Nor does it apply to prison disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974).
55. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968); 5 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1395, at 153 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). The
Supreme Court has stated that
[t]he primary object of the [confrontation clause] was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the man-
ner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). This does not mean, however, that
the confrontation right is a right to have the accuser face the fact-finder. The Court in
Mattox went on to explain that the confrontation right is a right to compel the witness to
testify face-to-face with the defendant. See id. at 244.
56. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,
725 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); 5 J. Wigmore, supra
note 7, § 1395, at 153 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
57. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
58. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418-19 (1965) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895).
59. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 406-07 (1965).
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physical presence is a tangential sixth amendment concern,e the Court
never relinquished the requirement of face-to-face confrontation. It
merely did not discuss the right to face the accuser as it was not in issue
in those cases.61 In 1968, in Barber v. Page,6' the Court reaffirmed that
the right of confrontation includes both the right to cross-examine and
the right to a face-to-face meeting63 and the Court has continued to de-
fine the confrontation right as encompassing both these rights. 4 Barber
and Ohio v. Roberts65 suggest that the Supreme Court, if faced with the
question today, would require physical presence if possible. In Barber,
the Court held that a witness is not unavailable unless the state has made
a good faith effort to secure his presence at the trial.66 In Roberts, the
Court required either the production of the witness or a demonstration
that the witness was unavailable.67 These cases imply that the right of
confrontation still requires the physical presence of the accuser unless he
is shown to be unavailable.
The procedures discussed above,68 which are designed to prevent the
child from viewing the defendant, might therefore fall if constitutionally
challenged. Even though they allow cross-examination of the child vic-
timS,69 the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to a face-to-face
60. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (primary right secured by the
sixth amendment right of confrontation is the right to cross-examination); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (same). Wigmore agrees that the main purpose of the
confrontation right is to cross-examine, not "the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness,
or of being gazed upon by him." 5 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1395, at 150 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
61. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418-20 (1965) (issue was whether the
defendant's inability to cross-examine his accuser denied him his sixth amendment right);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (issue was whether a statement made at a
preliminary hearing without adequate opportunity to cross-examine and later introduced
at trial denied defendant the right to cross-examine his accuser).
62. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
63. Id. at 725. Wigmore's analysis is in line with the Court's. He states that although
the main purpose of the confrontation clause is the right to cross-examine, a secondary
objective is to allow the jury to judge the demeanor of the witness. See 5 J. Wigmore,
supra note 7, § 1395, at 150-53 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). But see Sex Abuse Prosecu-
tions, supra note 46, at 823 & n.108, 824 (author concedes that the Supreme Court has
defined the right of confrontation as the right to face one's accuser, yet argues that the
right of confrontation may be satisfied without a face-to-face meeting).
64. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315
(1974); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970) (quoting h1attox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1895)).
65. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
66. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968).
67. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). But see id. at 65 n.7 (Court, citing
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), indicated without explanation that a demonstration
of unavailability is not necessary if trial confrontation is of remote utility).
68. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 1979) (cross-examina-
tion of victim permitted); People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 2d 78, 82, 195 P.2d 393, 395 (same),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948), overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d
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meeting with his accuser is thwarted."0 Recollection, truth and commu-
nication clearly are influenced by a face-to-face confrontation.71 This
"benign intimidation" factor is an important element of the right of
confrontation.72
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
A. Standards
In order to capture the testimony of a child victim of a sex crime with
a minimum of trauma for the child and without abridging the defend-
ant's right to a face-to-face confrontation with his accuser, a balancing of
interests is required.73  From its earliest interpretations, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the right of confrontation is not absolute74 and
209, 232, 302 P.2d 307, 322 (1956), overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal.
2d 631, 648-49, 388 P.2d 33, 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212 (1964); Parisi v. Superior Court,
144 Cal. App. 3d 211, , 192 Cal. Rptr. 486, 491 (1983) (defense counsel chose not to
cross-examine); Libai, supra note 6, at 1020 (proposal allows cross-examination); Parker,
supra note 6, at 697 (same).
70. See, eg., United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant
not present in the same room as witness); People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 2d 78, 82, 195 P.2d
393, 395 (defendant held an oblique view of the witness), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835
(1948), overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 232, 302 P.2d 307,
322 (1956), overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 648-49, 388 P.2d
33, 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212 (1964); Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661,
665, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 851 (1981) (defendant and witness could not see each other
during testimony of witness); Libai, supra note 6, at 1017 (defendant is not in same room
as witness); Parker, supra note 6, at 668 (same).
71. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); United States v. Benfleld,
593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980)
(confrontation ensures reliability and truth); 5 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, §1367, at 32-33
(J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) (reviewing advantages of cross-examination).
72. In its most positive aspect, this face-to-face confrontation may be considered to be
benign intimidation. It is intimidation for the purpose of eliciting the truth and is not to
be confused with attempting to coerce the victim not to testify.
73. See Libai, supra note 6, at 1005; Parker, supra note 6, at 643-44. The conflicting
interests to be balanced are the defendant's right of confrontation and the state's interest
in prosecuting child molestation cases. The Supreme Court has recognized that states
have "a strong interest in effective law enforcement." See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
64 (1980).
A similar dilemma was encountered by the courts in rape cases. The rape victim in
many cases was too fearful to bring charges. State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 373, 438
A.2d 402, 407 (1981). The apprehension derived in part from the fear of being subjected
to rigorous questioning about her prior sexual activities. Id. The victim would often then
refuse to cooperate with the prosecution. A balancing of interests-the state's interest in
obtaining convictions of rapists and the fundamental right of the defendant to face his
accuser-was therefore also required in rape cases. In response to this problem, many
states passed rape shield laws which restrict the defendant's right to ask the rape victim
about her sexual history. Brown, Historical Perspective: Rape Shield Law, 24 N.H.B.J.
95, 95 (1983). On the federal level, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 states that "reputation
or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of. . . rape. . . is
not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 412.
74. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Griswold, supra note 52, at 714.
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"must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case."" Many exceptions to the confrontation require-
ment have been allowed by the Court.76 The defendant may waive his
right of confrontation by not appearing at trial,7 by being disruptive dur-
ing trial and thereby causing his removal from the courtroom,78 by
pleading guilty in a state criminal trial79 or by threatening the witness.rO
Dying declarations, a major exception to the confrontation clause,"' have
long been admitted as evidence at trial.8 2 In addition, if a witness is un-
available at a second trial, his prior testimony at the first trial is admissi-
ble as evidence at the second if the statement is reliable and necessary to
the case.
83
75. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
76. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Griswold, supra note 52, at
714; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (sixth amendment right to
confrontation may be waived by consent or misconduct); Motes v. United States, 178
U.S. 458, 471 (1900) (sixth amendment right can be waived if witness is absent due to
defendant's "suggestion, procurement or act"); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282
(1897) (admission of dying declarations and depositions of witnesses who have died since
the first trial allowed under the sixth amendment). The procedure proposed in this Note
comes into play only in the absence of these approved exceptions to the confrontation
clause.
77. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912); United States v. Barracota, 45 F.
Supp. 38, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); see also Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805, 809
(9th Cir. 1937) (defendant can waive his right to be present at his trial by voluntarily not
appearing at trial).
78. Moore v. Scurf, 494 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D. Iowa 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 647 F.2d 854 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); see also Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if he is
disruptive in court); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (right to confron-
tation may be waived, at times, by misconduct).
79. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
For this waiver to be valid under the due process clause, it must be voluntary and know-
ing. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
80. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977).
81. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). Dying declarations are also
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) states "[i]n a prosecution for
homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believ-
ing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he be-
lieved to be his impending death" may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2).
The confrontation clause is not a codification of the hearsay rules. California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). Although they guarantee similar rights, they are not equal. Id.
The sixth amendment right to confrontation can be violated even though the statement
would be admissible under a hearsay exception. Id. at 155-56; see Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 722-26 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406-08 (1965). Likewise, a viola-
tion of a hearsay exception does not necessarily mean the right to confrontation under the
sixth amendment has been violated. Green, 399 U.S. at 156. For an exception to the
confrontation clause to be valid, it must be based on necessity. See infra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text.
82. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
83. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972). A two part test was set forth in
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The constitutionality of using electronic video equipment to take the
testimony of witnesses in criminal cases has not been specifically ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to
have considered the issue. The two leading cases are United States v.
Benfield 4 and United States v. Terrazas-Montano.85  In Benfield, an
adult woman, who had been kidnapped and was afraid to testify in the
same room as the defendant, gave a videotaped deposition that was then
used at trial.8 6 The witness was not able to see the defendant, nor was
she aware that the defendant was watching her testimony.87 The Eighth
Circuit in that case adhered to the Supreme Court's analysis that the
right of confrontation includes the right to a face-to-face meeting and the
right to cross-examine. 8 It also stated that any exception must be "nar-
row in scope and based on necessity or waiver."8 9
Within these broad guidelines, the Benfield court did not prohibit the
use of electronic video equipment in court.90 It stated that face-to-face
confrontation via a two-way closed circuit television might be constitu-
tional if there is a "showing of extraordinary circumstances necessitating
reliance on the procedure" 91 or if the parties agree to a certain procedure
or if the procedure closely adheres to traditional courtroom scenes. 92
Benfield thus establishes several standards for the use of electronic video
equipment to take the testimony of witnesses. First, a face-to-face meet-
ing between the defendant and the witness ordinarily must occur.93 Sec-
ond, the defendant must be afforded the right to cross-examine the
witness.94 Third, any exception to these two rights must be narrow in
scope.95
Although the Benfield court did not present a definitive test to deter-
mine narrowness, it is argued in this Note that this must be a two-
pronged test. Both the procedure and the subject matter of the exception
must be narrow. The Benfield court did provide a guideline to test the
narrowness of the procedure: It must closely adhere to traditional court-
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980): the prosecution must make a good faith effort to
produce the witness; and the hearsay statement must bear adequate "indicia of reliabil-
ity." Id. at 66. Reliability can be inferred if the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. Id. If not, the statement will be considered reliable if there is a show-
ing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
84. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
85. 747 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1984).
86. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 817.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 821. The right of confrontation applies to all stages of the trial. This in-
cludes a deposition. See id. at 821; State v. Turner, 345 N.W.2d 552, 559 (Iowa Ct. App.
1983).
89. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 822 n.11.
92. See id. at 821.
93. Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
94. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
95. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
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room scenes.96 It would be overly broad, however, to allow the exception
in all instances when the procedure closely resembles a traditional court-
room scene. To sustain the narrowness requirement, the procedure
should be employed only in certain types of cases and applied only to
limited categories of witnesses. The narrowness of the subject is closely
entwined with and receives definition from the fourth requirement: that
any exception be based on necessity or waiver.97 The necessity test may
be met by a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" which militate
for9" the use of this procedure.99
B. Striking an Acceptable Balance
The most acceptable balance between the confrontation clause and the
state's interest in prosecuting these cases would be to have the child"°°
victim testify in a room separate from the defendant. The child would be
accompanied by a bailiff and a parent or other trusted adult. He or she
would face television monitors that would give him or her a view of the
judge, defendant and attorneys. The judge, attorneys, defendant, jury
and spectators would view the child from a separate monitor in the main
courtroom. The television transmission would be instantaneous and the
defendant would be able to interrupt the proceedings at any time to con-
fer with his attorney.10 1
This technique would be employed only if the prosecution shows by a
preponderance of evidence that a less stressful atmosphere for the child
victim/witness is necessary. The most obvious way to meet this burden
of proof would be with the expert testimony of a psychiatrist stating that
the child's trauma would be substantially compounded if he or she were
required to testify in a traditional courtroom setting.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See infra Pt. III.C.4.
99. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822 n. 11.
100. "Child" is defined according to state law.
101. A similar technique was employed in Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336
(Mo. 1975) (en banc), a case that involved a prosecution for possession of marijuana. The
prosecution's witness testified from an office in a crime laboratory via closed circuit televi-
sion. Id. at 337. Two stationary cameras and two monitors in the courtroom and a cam-
era and a monitor in the laboratory were employed. Id. The judge, lawyers and witness
used microphones. Id. All of those present in the courtroom-judge, counsel and defend-
ant--could hear and see the witness and the witness, in turn, could see and hear the
participants in the courtroom. Id. Transmission was instantaneous. Id. The court up-
held the procedure on the basis that the confrontation clause did not require physical
presence of the witness. See id. at 339. Because pre-recorded videotaped testimony is not
instantaneous, it is distinguishable from two-way closed circuit television. Pre-recorded
videotape testimony implicates additional issues of hearsay and fundamental fairness
under the due process clause and is beyond the scope of this Note.
1985] 1011
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
C. Application of the Standards
1. Face-to-Face Confrontation
The first constitutional requirement that must be satisfied in order to
use two-way closed circuit television to capture the testimony of child
victims of sex crimes is a face-to-face confrontation between the defend-
ant and the witness at trial.102 Physical confrontation is not fully met by
the procedure proposed in this Note. The proposed procedure does,
however, allow the defendant to face the witnesses at trial, even though
the face-to-face confrontation does not take place in a single room. The
defendant and the child victim are in each other's view throughout the
proceeding. Although the confrontation is produced electronically, it is
instantaneous. 0 3 Thus, this technique approximates most of the ele-
ments of physical presence.' 0 4
The use of a two-way closed circuit television to take the testimony of
child victims of sex offenses is in accord with recent case law. 0 -5
Although the court in United States v. Benfield °6 held that videotaping
the victim's testimony in that case was unconstitutional, 107 the same
court in United States v. Terrazas-Montano'08 found that the right of
confrontation was satisfied even though the depositions of the witnesses
were videotaped and subsequently used at trial."° Thus, the Benfield
court's main objection to the videotaping technique employed there was
that it allowed for only partial confrontation." 0 The court in Terrazas-
Montano distinguished the facts of that case."' In Terrazas-Montano,
the defendant, accused of transporting an illegal alien across state lines,
faced the witnesses throughout the videotaped deposition." 12 The same is
true for the procedure proposed in this Note even though the face-to-face
confrontation does not take place in a single room. This proposal affects
only the procedure by which evidence is presented; the substantive con-
102. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
103. See Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
104. See id. at 339. As the court in Benfield noted, "prior to the availability of televi-
sion, confrontation generally involved a face-to-face meeting with one's adversaries."
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 1979). This happenstance alone,
however, cannot foreclose the use of two-way closed circuit television to take the testi-
mony of child victims of sexual molestation. Cf. 2A N. Singer, supra note 52, § 49.02, at
348-49 (statutes and constitutions may be construed to adapt to changing conditions and
may thus be applied to circumstances unknown at time of enactment).
105. See United States v. Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that videotaped deposition shown at trial did not violate the confrontation clause);
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821-22, 822 n. 11 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the
use of videotape might be constitutional under the confrontation clause if there were a
showing of necessity).
106. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
107. See id. at 821.
108. 747 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1984).
109. See id. at 469-70.
110. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822.
111. See 747 F.2d at 469-70.
112. See id.
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cerns of the confrontation clause remain fully protected.' 3 Although
physical confrontation is forfeited, the jury is still able to capture the
demeanor of the child witness. The accuser can see the accused and
must testify while the defendant looks on. The "intimidation factor"
therefore still weighs heavily in the defendant's favor." 4
2. Opportunity To Cross-Examine
The second standard to be met is that the defendant must be given the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness."1 5 The defendant's right to
face and cross-examine his accuser is of extreme importance. 1 6 The de-
fendant stands accused of a very serious crime." 7 The only way to elicit
the truth and to test the veracity of the child victim's testimony is by
intense cross-examination"' and by viewing the demeanor of the child
when he or she is forced to testify in front of the accused." 9 The proce-
dure proposed in this Note gives the defendant's counsel full opportunity
to cross-examine the child witness.
Because the first prong of the constitutional test-face-to-face confron-
tation-is not fully met, 20 the proposed technique must pass the strin-
gent third and fourth requirements discussed above to qualify as an
exception.1 21 Any exception must be narrow in scope as to both the tech-
nique employed and the subject to which it is applied. To be considered
narrow, the procedure must closely adhere to the traditional courtroom
scene and the types of cases in which and the witnesses for whom this
procedure is used must also be limited." 2
3. Procedural Narrowness: Traditional Courtroom Setting
The procedure herein proposed reflects a traditional courtroom
scene.1 23 There is face-to-face confrontation, albeit via two-way closed
113. See supra Pt. III.B., C.
114. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
115. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
116. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
117. The crime of child sexual abuse is defined in various ways throughout the states
but is in all cases classified as a felony. See supra note 1.
118. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418-19 (1965) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
119. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,
725 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); United States v. Ben-
field, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979); 5 J. Wigmore, supra note 7, § 1365, at 28, §1367,
at 32-33 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
120. See supra Pt. III.C.1.
121. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
122. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821, 822 n.11 (8th Cir. 1979).
123. Cf United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[a] videotaped
deposition supplies an environment substantially comparable to a trial"). The Benfield
court found the procedure used in that case unconstitutional, however, because the de-
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circuit television.1 24 Defense counsel has full opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness.125 All parties normally present in a traditional court-
room setting are present: defendant, witnesses, counsel for the parties,
judge, jury and spectators. They are in separate rooms yet in each
other's view. The proposed scheme allows a parent or a trusted adult to
accompany and comfort a frightened child witness. This presence reas-
sures the child that no harm will come to him or her as a result of testify-
ing. Nothing prohibits this technique as long as the adult refrains from
prompting the child. 126
The court must also ensure that the prosecution observe some precau-
tions with regard to the televising technique itself. 127 Distortion of the
witness and his or her testimony must be avoided. 128 What the jury sees
may be distorted by the camera.' 29 Lens or angle variations should be
adjusted to capture the subtle changes in the witness' demeanor-such as
nervous twitches, paling or blushing-that might easily be lost. 3  Use of
color tape, as opposed to black and white, is therefore important to en-
fendant was not actively involved in the taking of the deposition. See id. The scheme
proposed herein, on the other hand, does allow the defendant ordinary courtroom
participation.
124. See supra Pt. III.C.1.
125. See supra Pt. III.C.2.
126. In some courts, young children are allowed to sit in the adult's lap while testify-
ing. Meyers, supra note 7, at 16; Tender Years Exception, supra note 42, at 132 n.97.
127. See Joseph, Videotape Evidence in the Courts-1983, in Video Techniques in Trial
and Pretrial 35, 40 (1983). Some courts and commentators feel that videotaping accu-
rately transmits the scene. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972);
Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S.
935 (1972); Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); Morrill,
Enter-The Video Tape Trial, 3 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 237, 256 (1970). In one case, in
order to admit a movie-not a videotape-as evidence, the court required proof that the
cameraman was properly trained, the camera was in working order and the films accu-
rately represented the events. See Barham v. Nowell, 243 Miss. 441, 448-49, 138 So. 2d
493, 495 (1962). Motion pictures are more likely to distort than videotape because of lens
variations, film speed and development. Joseph, supra, at 50. But cf Kansas City v.
McCoy, 525 S.W.2d at 340-41 (Bardgett, J. dissenting) (demeanor of the witness is not
conveyed accurately via television).
128. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (make-up and other
techniques to yield a more visually appealing package should be avoided); Joseph, supra
note 127, at 40 (admissibility of videotape evidence is allowed if it is proved that it is an
accurate transmission).
129. Stores v. State, 625 P.2d 820, 828 n.25 (Alaska 1980); see H. Bettinger, Television
Techniques 67 (1947); Bermant & Jacoubovitch, Fish Out of Water: A Brief Overview of
Social and Psychological Concerns About Videotaped Trials, 26 Hast. L.J. 999, 1001
(1975); Joseph, supra note 127, at 45; Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious
Constitutional Questions, 55 Or. L. Rev. 567, 574-75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Criminal Videotape Trial]; see also German, Merin & Rolfe, Videotape Evidence at Trial,
6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 209, 210 (1982). Camera angles can make a witness appear smaller
or larger than he or she is. See H. Bettinger, supra, at 64-65. Lighting can also change
the witness' appearance. See H. Zettl, Television Production Handbook 371 (2d ed.
1968).
130. See Stores v. State, 625 P.2d 820, 828 n.25 (Alaska 1980) (quoting The Criminal
Videotape Trial, supra note 130, at 574-76); The Criminal Videotape Trial, supra note
129, at 576.
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sure accurate transmission of the witness' demeanor.13' Focus on the
testifying witness should be as close-up and as full-length as possible.' 32
Effort should also be made to capture valuable first impressions, such as
the witness' entrance into the courtroom and the witness' approach to
the witness stand.133
Defense counsel might argue that a child may think that testifying via
television is a game. This, however, is part of ensuring that a child is
competent to testify and that he or she understands the seriousness of the
proceeding.135 It is not part of the confrontation issue. The final deter-
mination as to the child's competency rests with the trial court judge, 36
who has a duty to examine a young child to ensure that the child has the
necessary ability to comprehend, remember and relate the alleged
events. 137
4. Substantive Narrowness: Necessity
The exception carved out in this Note is also narrow in scope as to
subject. It applies only in the prosecution of child molestation cases and
only to capture the testimony of the young victim. It may be used only if
the prosecution meets its burden of proving by a preponderance of evi-
dence 38 that a less stressful atmosphere for the child victim is necessary.
131. See The Criminal Videotape Trial, supra note 129, at 576. On the other hand,
color tape, if not adjusted properly, may add color where there is none. Id. at 576 n.66.
132. See E. Stasheff, R. Bretz, J. Gartley & L. Gartley, The Television Program 28
(5th ed. 1976) (close-ups are necessary to depict the scene accurately).
133. See The Criminal Videotape Trial, supra note 129, at 576.
134. See Timnick, Legal Tangle, Nat'1 L.J., Sept. 10, 1984, at 9, coL 1.
135. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
136. See Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895); United States v. Har-
din, 443 F.2d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Doran v. United States, 205 F.2d 717, 718 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953).
137. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
138. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Court required that an unavailable
witness' hearsay statement bear adequate "indicia of reliability"). The party claiming
unavailability of the witness must show that it made a good faith effort to produce the
witness. Id. at 74-75. Reliability requires a showing that the statement falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception or has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. at 66. These standards are lower than clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because the Court accepts such a low standard when the witness is unavailable, it
is unlikely to impose a higher standard when the witness is available. In addition, the
Court has used the preponderance standard for questions of admissibility. See Nix v.
Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 n.5 (1984) (using preponderance standard for "placing
evidence of unquestioned truth before juries"); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
177 n.14 (1974) (controlling burden of proof at suppression hearing should not be more
than the preponderance standard). The circuits are divided on the burden of proof neces-
sary when the defendant has waived his right of confrontation. Compare United States
v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (court adopted a "preponderance" stan-
dard seeing no reason to impose higher burden of proof-clear and convincing- where
there has been a waiver of the confrontation right by misconduct), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct.
2385 (1984) with United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir.) (court rejected
"preponderance" standard of proof when the defendant has waived his right of confron-
tation because the standard is insufficient to protect such an important right), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
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The issue is too important to the defendant 139 to justify no burden on the
prosecution. Conversely, to charge the prosecution with a higher burden
of proof 4 n---for example, beyond a reasonable doubt-would be to im-
pose a standard that would, in essence, obliterate the exception in most
cases.14 1 The importance of the defendant's constitutional right and the
state's interest dictate the application of a preponderance of proof stan-
dard prior to invoking this procedure.
The procedure proposed in this Note is based on the necessity of gain-
ing the accurate testimony of the only witness who knows what really
happened.142 There is a strong public interest in bringing child molesta-
tion cases to prosecution. 143 Without the child victim's testimony, the
state has little chance of convicting these defendants.'" If the child is
too afraid to testify or testifies while in terror of the defendant, however,
either the testimony will not be obtained or it will be poorly given.' 45
The child's fear of testifying in the same room as the defendant' 46 or in a
traditional open courtroom147 is minimized by the procedure proposed in
this Note.1 48 If this interest is not strongly considered in the balancing
approach, very few child molesters will be convicted. 49 Extraordinary
circumstances are present in child molestation cases if the prosecution
shows by a preponderance of evidence its inability to prosecute these
cases successfully unless a less stressful atmosphere is provided for the
child victim/witness.
139. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
140. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972) (The Supreme Court stated that
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard must be applied to prove every element of a
crime, but not to determine the admissibility of evidence at trial.).
141. Cf. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (rejecting "rca-
sonable doubt" standard because it might eliminate possibility of finding a waiver to sixth
amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). One court rejected a "reasonable doubt"
standard where there was a waiver of the sixth amendment because it considered the
decision regarding the applicable standard of proof in this situation "purely an eviden-
tiary ruling, not a decision on. . . substantive guilt." United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d
616, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
142. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
143. See Libai, supra note 6, at 978 (state interest in prosecuting child molesters out-
weighs parent's interest in protecting the child); cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64
(1980) ("every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement"). As previ-
ously stated, it is the state interest in prosecuting child molestation cases that must be
balanced against the defendant's right to confrontation. Although a victim/witness in a
child molestation case-as any other victim or witness in a criminal case-has no real
legal standing in the case, he or she certainly needs the court's protection from further
abuse. Victims of crimes should be treated with dignity, respect and sensitivity by the
court system. Thus, if the proposed scheme does not violate a defendant's constitutional
rights, there is a strong argument for its application.
144. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
145. See Confronting Child Victims, supra note 2, at 387.
146. See Libai, supra note 6, at 1018; Parker, supra note 6, at 652-53.
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
148. See supra Pt. III.B.
149. See supra notes 5, 19-31 and accompanying text.
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D. Danger of Enlargement
It can be argued that this exception is susceptible to enlargement to
encompass anyone who is too fearful to testify in the same room as the
defendant. 5 ' The constitutional rights of the defendant, however, can-
not be infringed to such an extent. 5 ' In child molestation cases, there
are extenuating circumstances, not present in other cases, that require
the use of the two-way closed circuit television.' 52 The major factor is
the threat of additional pyschological damage to a young child if he or
she is forced to testify in open court with the defendant in the same
room. 113 Some psychologists believe that psychological damage is caused
not only by the sexual abuse' but also by the related subsequent
events-for example, family reaction to the crime' and the number of
times the child is forced to relate the events and testify in open court in
the same room as the defendant.' 56 This aftermath trauma may impede
the child's sexual development and maturation.57 This interference with
psychological development is not present in the case of adult victims.
Furthermore, children do not understand that because they are in a court
of law the proximity of the accused poses no threat. 15 Adults, on the
other hand, know that they are protected in court even though the ac-
cused may be in the same room with them.' Children also have very
limited experience with courtrooms and are frightened by the open
court,"eo whereas adults are more familiar with the function of a court
and the logistics involved, if only from television or the movies.
The potential for abuse created by a broad application of this proce-
dure must be carefully controlled by the courts. The use of two-way
closed circuit television to take testimony of witnesses, therefore, should
only be allowed for children who have suffered a trauma at least as great
as that stemming from sexual abuse. To impinge on a defendant's funda-
mental constitutional right, the scale must tip to the other side quite
heavily.' 6 ' In addition, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of
150. See Timnick, supra note 134, at 9, cols. 1-2; cf. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d
815, 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1979) (use of videotaped testimony of adult woman who had been
kidnapped and was too fearful to testify held violative of defendant's confrontation right).
151. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
153. See Libai, supra note 6, at 984; Parker, supra note 6, at 644 n.10 (quoting Libai,
supra note 6).
154. See J. Palmer, supra note 6, at 522-23; Berliner, supra note 3, at 282; Rogers,
supra note 1, at 145.
155. See Berliner, supra note 3, at 283.
156. Libai, supra note 6, at 984; see R. Geiser, supra note 1, at 30; J. Palmer, supra
note 6, at 522-23; Chaneles, supra note 6, at 54; Parker, supra note 6, at 644-45; Rogers,
supra note 1, at 145-46.
157. J. Palmer, supra note 6, at 522-23; Parker, supra note 6, at 649-50.
158. Meyers, supra note 7, at 50.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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proof that greater psychological damage will occur if the child is forced
to testify in the same room as the defendant.162 It would be possible,
therefore, to use this procedure for children who have witnessed a crime
but who have not themselves been victimized. However, the level of
trauma associated with the crime and the witness' subsequent fear of the
defendant should be as high as that connected with being a victim of
sexual abuse. An example of this might be a child witnessing the murder
of his or her parent.163
CONCLUSION
The state has an interest in prosecuting child molestation cases. Often
this interest is impeded because parents are reluctant to subject their chil-
dren to further trauma during litigation. In addition, reliable, competent
testimony of the child victims is difficult to obtain. Although a portion
of this potential trauma stems from the child's fear of being in the same
room as the alleged offender, the criminal defendant has a right under
the sixth amendment to confront his accuser.
Courts and commentators have tried and suggested various ways to
balance the defendant's right of confrontation and the state's interest in
bringing child molestation cases to prosecution. The use of two-way
closed circuit television to take the testimony of child victims of sex
crimes strikes the best balance between these two interests. This narrow
exception comports with the Supreme Court's analysis of the right of
confrontation and also provides a much needed, humane method of tak-
ing the testimony of the victims of child molestation. As reports of child
sexual abuse continue to rise, this procedure will allow for an equitable
treatment of both the traumatized child victims and the alleged
offenders.
Maria H. Bainor
162. See supra Pt. III.B.
163. See Parker, supra note 6, at 654.
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